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"induced an individual to break the law 
and the defense of entrapment is at 
issue .. . . the prosection must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was disposed to commit the 
criminal act prior to first being ap-
proached by Government agents." 
Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing 
United Statesv. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481 
(D.C. Cir. 1991». 
The Court next explained that in a 
situation where an individual is merely 
presented with the opportunity to com-
mit a crime, the immediate willingness 
to engage in criminal conduct gives a 
clear indication of a defendant's crimi-
nal predisposition. Id. at 1541. 
Jacobson's conviction, however, in-
volved an extended effort on the part of 
the Government, culminating in an 
arrest only after twenty-six months of 
ongoing correspondence with fictitious 
organizations. Id. Thus, the Court 
ruled that although Jacobson may have 
been predisposed to receive mail-order 
child pornography by the time of his 
arrest in 1987, the Government did not 
prove that this inclination developed 
independently ofthe investigation di-
rectedtowardJacobsonsince 1985. Id. 
The evidence produced by the Gov-
ernmentconcerning Jacobson's sexual 
propensity prior to the law enforce-
ment mail campaign was insufficient 
to support a finding of his predisposi-
tion to commit a criminal act. Id. The 
Court opined that the receipt of two 
magazines from a California bookstore, 
as the sole piece of such pre-investiga-
tive evidence, could indeed indicate 
Jacobson's desire to view sexually ori-
ented photographs. Id. This inference, 
however, merely demonstrated a cer-
tain preference to act within a broad 
range of sexual conduct, only some of 
which was criminal, and thus was not 
probative of a predisposition to engage 
in illegal activity. Id. The Court 
further acknowledged that because 
most people tend to obey the law even 
if they disagree with it, evidence of 
one's inclination to perfonn what was 
once a lawful act does not justify an 
inference of a tendency to perfonn that 
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which is now illegal. Id. at 1542. 
Similarly, the Court emphasized 
that evidence produced during the in-
vestigation failed to prove Jacobson's 
predisposition to receive child pornog-
raphy through the mail. Id The Court 
viewed his responses to the many com-
munications prior to the commission 
of the actual crime as indicative only of 
Jacobson's personal inclinations and 
interests rather than sufficing as proof 
of any criminal design on his part. Id. 
Furthennore, the Government's tactic 
in its solicitation was to suggest to 
Jacobson that viewing the prohibited 
sexually oriented materials should be 
within his constitutional privilege of 
freedom of choice. Id. The Court 
concluded that the Government ex-
erted considerable pressure on him to 
obtain the outlawed materials as a pro-
test against an encroachment on his 
constitutionally guaranteed individual 
liberties. Id. Consequently, rational 
jurors could not detennine beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, absent the pro-
tracted investigation by the Govern-
ment, Jacobson was autonomously pre-
disposed to commit the crime. Id. at 
1543. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rhenquist, Justice Kennedy, and in 
part by Justice Scalia, maintained that 
the majority's position unnecessarily 
usurped a reasonable jury inference of 
predisposition. Id. at 1544. In the 
dissent's view, the holding redefined 
the tenn ''predisposition'' and placed a 
new requirement on law enforcement 
officials by demanding a detennina-
tion ofa "reasonable suspicion ofille-
gal activity before contacting a sus-
pect." Id.at 1544. Theminorityargued 
that the Government cannot induce a 
suspect to commit a criminal act 
through its communications until it 
actually provides the opportunity to 
engage in such illegal conduct, be-
cause until then, there can be no find-
ing of an implantation of criminal de-
sign in the mind of an innocent person. 
Id. In addition, the dissent lamented 
that the Government must now show 
not only that a suspect was predisposed 
to commit a crime before an opportu-
nity was presented, but also that such 
person was criminally predisposed 
before the Government came on the 
scene. Id. at 1545. Furthennore, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned that the readi-
ness with which Jacobson responded 
to the opportunity to commit the crime 
indicated that he likely would have 
broken the law if left to his own de-
vices. Id at 1543-44. 
Jacobson v. United States repre-
sents an important clarification of the 
law of entrapment because it places a 
limitation on the Government's use of 
undercover agents to enforce the law. 
The Supreme Court thus has reaffirmed 
the individual's right of freedom from 
unwarranted government intrusion by 
recognizing a level of intervention by 
law enforcement officers at which a 
finding of criminal predisposition by a 
jury is unreasonable. Jacobson will 
effectively prompt the courts to scruti-
nize more carefully law enforcement 
sting operations, and will ultimately 
provide criminal defendants with a 
heightened opportunity to argue for 
exoneration if induced to engage in 
illegal activity by government offi-
cials. 
- Scott N. Alperin 
WUJiams v. UnitedStates: SUPREME 
COURT ESTABLISHES NA-
TIONAL CONSENSUS REGARD-
INGTHESCOPEOFAPPELLATE 
REVIEWUNDERTHESENTENC-
ING REFORM ACT OF 1984. 
In Williams v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 1112 (1992), the Supreme Court 
reviewed the Sentencing Refonn Act 
of 1984 ("Sentencing Act") in an at-
tempt to establish a national consensus 
on the scope of appellate review when 
a district court's sentence varies from 
the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion Guidelines ("Guidelines").. The 
Court held that when a lower court 
relies on both valid and invalid factors 
during sentencing, a reviewing court 
cannot affirm a sentence solely on its 
independent assessment that the dis-
trict court's departure from the Guide-
lines sentencing range was reasonable. 
The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin 
convicted Williams of possession ofa 
firearm while a convicted felon. The 
district court departed from the 
Guideline's recommended sentencing 
range of 18 to 24 months for a criminal 
with Williams' criminal history. The 
court determined that this sentencing 
range was inadequate because the range 
failed to take into account two out-
dated convictions and several previous 
arrests and sentenced Williams to 27 
months imprisonment based on sec-
tion 4A1.3 of the Guidelines Manual. 
This section allows a district court to 
increase a sentence "if 'reliable infor-
mation' indicates that the criminal his-
tory category does not adequately re-
flectthe seriousness of the defendant's 
criminal background or [his] propen-
sity for future criminal conduct." Id. at 
1117. Applying the appellate review 
provisions ofthe Sentencing Act, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld Williams's conviction and 
sentence. Id. 
The Sentencing Act permits dis-
trict courts to depart from the recom-
mended sentencing range established 
by the Sentencing Guidelines in cer-
tain circumstances. To ensure proper 
application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines by the district courts, the Act also 
provides for limited appellate review 
of sentencing in section 3742(f). Id. at 
1118. Section 3742(f)(1) provides for 
remand ofthe case if the sentence "was 
imposed in violation oflaw or imposed 
as a result ofan incorrect application of 
the sentencing guidelines." Id. (quot-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)(1988». In 
addition, section 3742(f)(2) provides 
that the appellate court may set aside 
the sentence and remand if the sen-
tence was "outside the applicable guide-
line range and is unreasonable or was 
imposed for an offense for which there 
is no applicable sentencing guidelines 
and is plainly unreasonable." Id. (quot-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2)(1988». 
In affirming Williams's convic-
tion, the court of appeals agreed with the provisions of the Sentencing Act 
the district court's assessmentthat''the which set forth the scope of appellate 
two outdated convictions were 'reli- review when a district court makes an 
able information,' indicating more ex- "incorrect application" of the sentenc-
tensive criminal conduct than was re- ing guidelines. Id. at 1120. The Court 
flected by Williams's criminal history noted that when a district court relies 
category." Id. at 1117 (citing Williams on an improper ground in departing 
v. UnitedStates,910F.2d 1574(1990». from the guideline range, a reviewing 
The court of appeals, however, rejected court is precluded from affirming a 
the district court's reliance upon sentence "based solely on its indepen-
Williams's past arrests which had not dent assessment that the departure was 
resulted in prosecution. The court of reasonable" under section 3742(f). Id. 
appeals noted that the Sentencing Act That provision, the Court explained, 
prohibits a court from departing from specified two circumstances in which 
the Guidelines based only on.a prior an appellate court must remand for 
arrest record. Id (citing § 4A1.3 ofthe resentencing: "(1) if the sentence was 
Guidelines Manual). Nevertheless, the imposed as a result of an incorrect 
court of appeals affirmed Williams's application of the Guidelines or (2) if 
sentence, concluding that "despite the the sentence is an unreasonable depar-
District Court's error in considering ture from the applicable guideline 
Williams's prior arrest record, the court range." Id. The Court noted, however, 
had 'correctly determined that Mr. that while unreasonable guidelines 
Williams's criminality was not re- departures are reviewed under section 
flected properly in the criminal history 3742(f)(2), "incorrect application" of 
category and that the relevant evidence the guidelines requires the same re-
justified the rather modest increase in view under section 3742(f)(1). Id 
sentence.'" Id. at 1118 (quoting Wil- Next, the Supreme Court set forth 
Iiams, 910 F.2d 1574, 1580 (1990». a two-part inquiry that the reviewing 
The United State Supreme Court court is obliged to conduct in order to 
granted certiorari to determine whether determine whether to apply section 
a reviewing court may affirm a district 3742(f)(1) or section 3742(f)(2). Un-
court sentence based on valid and in- der section 3742(f)(1) remand is re-
valid factors which differ from the quired if an appellate court finds that 
Guideline range. the sentence was "imposed either in 
The Supreme Court began its analy- violation of law or as a result of an 
sis by considering Williams' argument incorrect application ofthe Guidelines." 
that the use of his arrest record as a Id. If, however, the appellate court 
reason for departure was a misapplica- determines that the departure is not the 
tion of the Guidelines, and that the result of an interpretive or applicative 
"incorrect application" standard estab- error, it should question whether the 
lished in section 3742(f)(1) required "resulting sentence is an unreasonably 
remand once a departure ground was high or low departure from the relevant 
invalidated. Id at 1119. The Supreme guideline range," and remand the case 
Court found that for purposes of appel- as specified in section 3742(f)(2). Id. 
late review pursuant to section The Court refused to interpret these 
3742(f)(1), it is an "incorrect applica- provisions as requiring an automatic 
tion" of the Sentencing Guidelines remand to rectify every "incorrect ap-
when a district court departs from the plication" of the Guidelines and indi-
applicable sentencing range based on a cated that a remand is necessary only if 
factor, which was previously rejected the sentence was "imposed as a result 
by the Sentencing Commission as an of an incorrect application" of the 
appropriate basis for departure from Guidelines.Id. (emphasis in original). 
the guideline range. Id. Thus, the Court explained that an ap-
TheSupremeCourtnextturnedto pellate court's determination of 
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whether the sentence was imposed "as 
a result of' a misapplication of the 
Guidelines depends on ''whether the 
district court would have imposed the 
same sentence had it not relied upon 
the invalid factor or factors." Id. Ap-
plying this test, the Court noted that 
when a district court intentionally de-
parts from the Guideline range, the 
court's sentence is "imposed 'as a re-
sult of' a misapplication ofthe Guide-
lines, if the sentence would have been 
different but for the district court's 
error." Id. 
This decision provides substantial 
insight into the scope of appellate re-
view under the Guidelines of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. The Supreme 
Court in Williams gave an extremely 
narrow reading to the scope of such 
review, and emphasized the deference 
that appellate courts are to give to a 
district court's exercise of its sentenc-
ing discretion. In so ruling, the Court 
established a national consensus on the 
scope of appellate review under the 
Sentencing Reform Act. 
- Gloria A. Worch 
3011 Corp. v. District Court: 
CORPORATIONS CHARGED 
WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL. 
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court, 
327 Md.463, 610 A.2d 766 (1992), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a corporation has a right to a trial 
by jury when it is charged with a crimi-
nal offense carrying a maximum pen-
alty of imprisonment in excess of 90 
days. In a unanimous decision, the 
court interpreted section 4-302( e )(2)(i) 
ofMaryland's Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article as providing a statu-
tory right to a jury trial based on the 
maximum penalty provided for the 
offense itself and not the penalty likely 
to be imposed upon a particular defen-
dant. Therefore, although a corpora-
tion is not subject to imprisonment, it 
is entitled to a jury trial. 
3011 Corporation, trading as U.S. 
Books, and L.R. News, Inc., trading as 
Edgewood Books, were adult book 
stores in Harford County. Both corpo-
rations were charged with 100 counts 
of knowingly displaying sexually ori-
ented material for advertising purposes 
in violation of art. 27, section 416D of 
the Maryland Code. Each violation 
was punishable by a fine of up to 
$1,000 or imprisonment of up to six 
months. Both corporations also were 
charged with one count of exhibiting 
obscene matter in violation of art. 27, 
section 418 of the Maryland Code. 
The penalty for this charge was up to a 
$1,000 fme and/or imprisonment up to 
one year. Similar charges were filed 
against Larry Hicks, who was an offi-
cer of both corporations. 
All parties requested a jury trial. 
The District Court for Harford County 
granted Mr. Hicks's demand for a jury 
trial and subsequently tninsferred his 
case to the Circuit Court for Harford 
County. However, the district court 
denied both corporations' request for a 
jury trial and the corporations filed 
petitions for writs of certiorari to the 
Circuit Court for Harford County. After 
a hearing, the petitions were dismissed 
and the corporations appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
While the appeal was pending, the 
counts for exhibiting obscene material 
were dismissed. Before argument in 
the court of special appeals, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ 
of certiorari to determine whether a 
corporation charged in district court 
with a criminal offense carrying a pen-
alty in excess of 90 days had a right to 
a jury trial. 
Thecorporations argued in the court 
of appeals that they had a statutory 
right to jury trial under section 4-
302(e)(2)(i) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, and that they were 
entitled to a constitutional right to a 
jury trial under Articles 5,21, and 23 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
and under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. 3011 Corp., 327 Md. 467-
68, 610 A.2d 768. The State argued 
that no corporation ever has the right to 
ajury trial under the statute because the 
statute requires a defendant to be sub-
ject to more than 90 days imprison-
ment and a corporation cannot be im-
prisoned. Id. at 468, 610 A.2d at 768. 
The State contested the Maryland con-
stitutional right to a jury trial by argu-
ing that the charge was a minor offense 
to which the right to jury trial does not 
attach. Id, 610 A.2dat768-69 (citing, 
e.g., State v. Huebner, 305 Md. 601, 
608-10,505 A.2d l331,l335 (1986». 
The State also argued that there was no 
federal constitutional right to a jury 
trial for corporations since a corpora-
tion could not be imprisoned and the 
maximum fines were not substantial. 
Id., 610 A.2d at 769. 
The court of appeals found a right 
to a jury trial through statutory inter-
pretation and did not reach the consti-
tutional issues. The court ruled that if 
the crime with which the defendant is 
charged carries a penalty of imprison-
ment in excess of 90 days, a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial ifhe 
makes a timely request in district court. 
Id. at 469, 610 A.2dat 769. Thecourt 
rejected the State's contention that the 
particular defendant must be subject to 
imprisonment in excess of 90 days, 
holding that ''the maximum penalty 
provision relates to the offense itself 
and not the parti~ular defendant." Id. 
(emphasis in original). The court found 
that the Maryland General Assembly 
distinguished between less serious and 
more serious criminal offenses by au-
thorizing more than 90 days imprison-
ment for more serious crimes. Id 
Thus, the option of a jury trial was 
allowed for offenses with a maximum 
penalty in excess of90 days. Id. The 
court emphasized that the controlling 
principle guiding the constitutional 
right to a jury trial is the maximum 
sentence and place of incarceration that 
the legislature established for the par-
ticular offense, not the maximum sen-
tence or place of incarceration to which 
this particular defendant may be sub-
jected. Id (citingKawamurav. State, 
299 Md. 276, 292, 473 A.2d438, 447 
(1984». The court found that the Mary-
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